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From Minsk To Vladivostok - Is it an East Slavic Civilization?
Bertil Haggman
Bertilhaggman@hotmail.com
Introduction
Civilizationalists have never agreed on how to categorize "civilizations." They even
have difficulty with defining the word. In the International Society for the
Comparative Study of Civilizations (ISCSC), the primary scholarly society for
ongoing studies of civilizations (past, present, and future), roundtable discussions are
held at annual meetings debating which cultures to include in the list of civilizations.
For example, the issue was raised about where Persia/Iran falls: within "Islamic
Civilization" or uniquely a civilization itself. A case was made by our Persian
specialist that rather than being part of Islamic Civilization, Persia, a much older
culture, is much more than Islamic and can be said to have been the shaper of Islamic
Civilization, not the reverse.
Another of our members made a case for seeing Ethiopia, that most ancient culture in
East Africa, as a civilization unique in the world. He convinced us.
What can one do with Jewish Civilization? Arnold Toynbee dismissed it as a fossil,
but with the creation of the state of Israel, the fossil designation is patently wrong.
I am a member of this society who has made a case for American Civilization with
roots in Europe, but with an increasingly independent identity. I am not alone in this;
other scholars have noted this too—but the issue is not permanently resolved yet. It is
still a designation in transition.
When Max Lerner in his book America as a Civilization (1957) proposed that
America had created its own civilization distinct from the European, he met with
resistance from macro-historian Arnold Toynbee and others. In 2007 it was 50 years
since Lerner's book was first published (it was republished in 1987 with an appendix
covering the period from 1957 to 1987). I follow his lead.
How people see themselves is also part of the identification of a civilization. The
thesis of this article is that there is an East Slavic Civilization that includes Belarus,
Russia, and Ukraine. This paper will make a case for recognizing an East Slavic
civilization—which can be validated by events on the ground. The choice of the
designation East Slavic is based on linguistic and cultural criteria, including religion.
The West Slavic Civilization (Poland, Czech Republic, Slovenia, Slovakia) has
characteristics far more in line with the Western European Civilization. Slavic is too
broad a designation; I believe that it needs to be subdivided—just as America is
separate in major respects from Europe.
Russia has long been a major concern of the West—and with the collapse of the
USSR, the big question geopolitically is: will Russia turn West or East? Although
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Russia has had a long history of wanting to be among Western powers, there are signs
that it is looking to China, once an enemy but now a potential ally. Currently the
West's attention is focused on Russia and on America's need for Russia to help in the
war against radical Islam (an internal Russian problem, too). Yet, the question is: are
we paying enough attention to another problem - Russia's relationship with the other
East Slavic states such as Ukraine, with attendant consequences for the United States
and the rest of Europe?
Since 1991, there have been extensive changes in the borderlands of Western
civilization. In this paper, Western civilization will be regarded as two civilizations
with the same roots but somewhat different characteristics: American and European.
With the Soviet Union collapsing, the United States remained as the hegemon, the
only superpower in the world. America has finally earned the right to be characterized
as a civilization of its own. It is no longer, as Toynbee said in 1958, in an exchange
with Lerner, a "tag-end" of Western civilization.
America's vitality, ingenuity, and freedom from the constraints of hereditary rule
(aristocracy) have sent it into a trajectory that differs a great deal from its ancestral
roots as a British offspring.
America has always had a technological impulse. There was never an impulse toward
conquest and domination. At the beginning it was an attempt, using the Monroe
Doctrine, to protect a weak and growing nation. Later it shifted to preventing any
other power from overshadowing or threatening its survival. Thus began the building
of a position of strength, partly because of geographical and ideological separation
from others by two vast oceans.
The great Polish historian Oscar Halecki (1891-1973) 1 in the 1950s (Halecki: 3-12)
sorted out the strange limitations of European history at the time. Western Europe
was often identified with the whole continent. There remained, however, a vast terra
incognita: East Central Europe between Sweden, Germany and Italy to the west and
Turkey and Russia on the other side. It is impossible to use only the conventional
division between Western and Eastern Europe. If an additional region is added,
Central Europe, this would have to be divided so that Europe would need a division
into four basic regions: Western, West Central, East Central, and Eastern.
This paper will deal with the Eastern part of Europe. East Central Europe became a
borderland of European civilization to another civilization. Countries like Poland,
Czechoslovakia, and Hungary joined European civilization in a second wave between
900 AD and 1000 AD. The civilization in the east has many names: East Slavic,
Christian Orthodox, Eurasian and Russian. The great changes since 1991 in Europe
makes it necessary to take a second look at the civilization to the east of European
civilization.
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An Aggressive Russian Civilization
The vision of 19 th century Russian Nikolai Danilevsky (1822 - 1885)2 was that
Russia as a separate civilization must absorb and then assimilate Europe. Danilevsky
was probably the chief theoretician of Panslavism; he anticipated the geopolitical
thinking founded by Swedish professor and geopolitician, Rudolf Kjellen (1864 1922) . [See Russia and Europe, (originally published in 1869 in Russian but never
published in English). A translation is under preparation in the United States.] This
Russian academic presented his own list of how the world was divided into
civilizations that were self-contained and functioned on their own. The Slavic
cultural-historical type was regarded as superior. Danilevsky wanted to reconquer
Constantinople as capital of a "Byzantic Empire." He urged Slavs to free themselves
from Turkish and German domination. Russia was thus to form a great Slavic empire.
It is of interest to note that there were signs of later political thinking in Danilevsky's
Russia and Europe. He advocated a policy of strength in that Russia could fulfill its
historical mission by transforming itself into a mighty empire. To do that it had to
assimilate Western civilization, which was in "spiritual decay." The national interests
of Russia thus justified a policy of imperial expansionism. It deserves to be
mentioned as having anticipated geopolitical thinking.
In The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (Huntington: 144) the
author quoted Danilevsky several times. Europeanizing efforts distort "the people's
life and replacing its forms with alien, foreign forms," "borrowing foreign institutions
and transplanting them to Russian soil," and "regarding both domestic and foreign
relations and questions of Russian life from a foreign, European viewpoint, viewing
them, as it were, through a glass fashioned to a European angle of refraction."
An Emerging Russian Culture
Oswald Spengler (1880-1936) 4 in his Decline of the West observed on the other hand
that Russian culture had not yet emerged. Russian civilization did not emerge from
Tartar domination until 1480. It was only somewhat more than 200 years after this
emergence that Tsar Peter I initiated a westernization process (termed by Spengler
pseudo-morphosis). In reality Peter's westernization was a rather superficial (and
th
often violent) affair. Later, Enlightenment and 19 century forms were, according to
Spengler, forced on Russia. The true Russian attitude is a primitive kind of
Christianity to which the coming millennium would belong. Unlike Toynbee (see
below) Spengler did not recognize a Russia that had tried historically to express itself
as a distinctive culture. The Russian "soul," in his view, would at last in the
of

21 century break through. This would cause Russia to revert to a kind of rural
Christianity of universal brotherhood and peasant obscurantism.
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Russian Civilization: A Culture of the Past
Arnold J. Toynbee (1889-1975) 5 in his work A Study of History, saw what he called
"the Orthodox Christian Offshoot in Russia" as forming around 1000 AD. In his
system, he puts the Time of Troubles (not to be confused with the technical historical
term for the period 1598-1613 in Russian history) starting in 1075 with the
disintegration of Kyi van Rus and ending in 1478 which was also the end of Tatar
overlordship. After that comes the Universal State from 1478 to 1881, the year of the
assassination of Tsar Alexander II. Then there would be a general phase of
disintegration. In stark contrast to Spengler, Toynbee sees Russian civilization wholly
in the past.
Feliks Koneczny and the Turanian Civilization
The Polish historian Feliks Koneczny (1862 - 1949)6 wrote extensively on
civilizations. His book On the Plurality of Civilisations was not published in English
until the 1960s. Civilizations, in his view, had roots in how family is structured. Is
the code monogamy or polygamy? This influences in the deepest way the whole
consciousness of society. Monogamy is connected to private property; polygamy is
related to clan identity. Property law and inheritance law are in turn dependent on
how family law is structured.
In the systematization of civilizations, Koneczny offered seven civilizations: Latin,
Jewish, Brahmin, Turanian, Byzantine, Arabic, and Chinese. Only the Latin
(Western) civilization with family emancipation had a separate public law leading to
a free society and emancipation of spiritual forces. The opposite pole to the West,
melded by Rome, is the Turanian civilization, which had a low estimate of spiritual
matters in general according to Koneczny.
The term Turanian is also used by the Russian Eurasianists. Trubetskoi, for instance,
labeled the Eurasian peoples as Turan, which comprises the Finno-Ugric, Samoyed,
Mongol and Manchurian peoples. 7 Notable is also that there is a Turkish and
Hungarian Turanism (in the case of Hungary related to the Huns). They form a
particular psychological type. The multi-ethnicity of Eurasia was emphasized by
Trubetskoi, but the Russians are mentioned as first among equals.
Russia belongs, legally and sociologically, to Turanian Civilization. Originally Russia
lacked public law in the Roman sense. There was only private law originating with
the ruler. Society has not been allowed any rights and has not been allowed to
organize itself.
Turanian civilization is historically centralized behind a powerful and autocratic
monarchy. Nations, in the Western sense, did not form in the area of Central Asia.
Only conglomerates of peoples and clans developed, according to Koneczny. In his
empire Genghis Khan organized conquered areas ruled by his subordinates.
Koneczny viewed Turanian civilization as reaching Muscovy through Tartar and
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol64/iss64/7
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Mongolian influences. Military organization developed into obligatory state service
under Tsar Ivan III but originated with the Khazars. With Western influence a mixed
civilization developed in Russia but the Turanian influence remains.
Samuel Huntington's Orthodox Russian Civilization
In The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, Samuel P.
Huntington (1927 - 2008) 8 on a world map included all of the Balkan Peninsula
(except Albania) in Orthodox civilization, including Greece, Ukraine and Belarus. He
further described Russia as a "torn country" for several centuries (from around 1700).
The roots in Kievan Rus and the Tatar overlordship of Russia shaped her in a way
that made her very different. At the same time, although attempting to westernize
Russia, Peter the Great reinforced the Asian characteristics of despotism, eliminating
any possible social and political pluralism.
The Bolshevik revolution initiated a third phase of Westernization, which will be
dealt with in the conclusions in this paper. Huntington believed that Communism
resolved the debate between Slavophiles and Westernizers in Russia. He stated what
the Russian position was:
"Russia was different from and fundamentally opposed to the West
because it was more advanced than the West. It was taking the lead in
the proletarian revolution which would eventually sweep across the
world."(Huntington: 141)
This new Russia had a bright Soviet future, thought the Communists. Russia could
now leapfrog the West. At the same time as Russia was different from the West the
revolution created close ties with the West. By using Western ideology against the
West itself, it became more involved with the West than ever before. The collapse of
the Soviet Union led to a renewed debate in Russia over westernization.
Eurasianism: A Turn to the East
With the opening of public debate in 1992 in Russia about classical Eurasianism of
the 1920s, the theory that Russia was a separate entity/civilization reemerged.
Among classical Eurasianists, six will be treated here: Nikolai Trubetskoi (1890 1938)9, Lev P. Karsavin (1882 - 1952)10, Petr Savitsky (1895 - 1968)11, George
Vernadsky (1887 - 1973)12, Roman O. Jakobson (1896 - 1982)13 and Petr P.
Suvchinsky (1892 - 1985)14. These men were active in the 1920s and claimed they
followed in the tradition of an older Russian nationalism. The circumstances by 1917
had changed when, after the Bolshevik Revolution, the Russian Empire had
collapsed. Thus Eurasian ideas called for new arguments, moving beyond the old
theory of imperial nationalism.
One could say that the main themes of Eurasianism were:
•

A special Eurasian culture, which is the basis for the Russian
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An ideology based on Christian Orthodox religion in a culture that is the
expression of nationwide interests.
The fate of Russia decided by its geostrategic location and as a bridge
between Europe and Asia.

Geographic and historic processes helped define Eurasia as a union of languages
(,language union). Jakobson and Trubetskoi stressed common characteristics acquired
by different languages in the course of their historical existence within the Eurasian
space. The Eurasianists suggested that Eurasia was an ethnographic mixture of
peoples. The Russians had much in common with the Turkic peoples of Eurasia, and
the nomadic "Turanians" also played an essential role in Russian state and culture.
The Eurasianists argued that the claim of unity in the Russian empire before 1917 had
been geographically founded. Eurasia was a tightly cohesive landmass. The
movement of peoples across this area had been shaped by geography. Furthermore
Russia was not a European society. Also (shockingly), the classical authors of the
movement argued that it was not even genuinely Slavic. The geographic and political
unity of the area in question had created a new entity: historically, culturally, socially,
linguistically, and anthropologically closely related but with some distinctions. It
made Eurasia almost like a nation-state.
The Eurasianists had inherited an anti-European attitude. They warned against the
Europeanization of the world as a result of "Romano-Germanic chauvinism." The
countries of Western Europe that had colonies, so they argued, considered other
cultures and civilizations inferior and Europeans sought to influence the rest of the
world. In contrast Russia should follow its own path.
Geographically the 1920s Eurasianists divided the western region in three parts:
(Western) Europe, including Poland; the Baltic states; and the Balkans. Asia
consisted of the Far East, Southeast Asia and Southwest Asia. In between these two
entities was a separate world of flatlands extending from the Danube estuary to the
Lena river basin of Siberia. It roughly corresponded with the Russian and later Soviet
empire.
Russians are closer to the non-Slavic peoples of this area than to such Slavicspeaking peoples of Poland, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia, all of which are closer
to Catholic Europe.
Eurasia as a geopolitical area was first realized by Genghis Khan, and his empire later
morphed into the Muscovite Empire. The Orthodox Church was considered one of the
pillars of Eurasia's cultural identity. This faith was not based on individualism, as
were Protestantism and Catholicism, but on brotherhood (sobornost), a concept more
common to all Eurasian peoples.
Peter I introduced European ideas to Russia, which opened up the country to all kinds
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol64/iss64/7
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of ideas that were strange to the Eurasianist mentality: imperialism, militarism,
capitalism, liberalism, parliamentarianism, and socialism/communism.
The main publication of the Eurasians was Evraziistvo (1926) and it appeared when
the movement was at its height. It gradually lost influence in the 1930s but the ideas
of the original Eurasianists was revived in the 20
below) with his ethnogenesis theory.

century by Lev Gumilev (see

In 1980 during Soviet times, 600 years after the battle of Kulikovo, when the forces
of the Golden Horde were defeated by a Russian army, attempts were made to
resurrect some Eurasianist ideas.
By 1992, Eurasianist theories were fully resurrected and quickly gained influence in
Russia. Lev Gumilev (1912 - 1992)15 who had published both before and after
Gorbachev, became a leading Eurasianist. During the Soviet era, he had spent long
periods in Gulag camps. Gumilev's two major ideas were: ethnos as a fundamental
structure in human history, essentially biological in nature, but unique to humans; and
"passionarity."
There is according to Gumilev a human drive to expand, create, and replicate, but
also a human ability to sacrifice for the sake of ideology. "Passion" is also a
hereditary biological ability of the man, and "passion-filled" individuals are creators
of history. For instance, Alexander the Great was one of these. Gumilev's
terminology has been widely criticized. Passion works against the basic instinct of
self-preservation of individuals. Modern Eurasianists believe Eurasia is a separate
civilization led by Russia that will eventually break the dominance of a declining
Europe and change the political and cultural map of the world. 16
It is of interest to note that Kazakhstan's president, Nursultan Nazarbaev, has
established a Eurasian University in the new capital of Astana and named it after
Gumilev.
Conclusions
The short overview above gives an idea of how leading civilizationists have viewed
the civilization that stretches from Ukraine and Belarus in the west to Vladivostok in
the east, leaping over the border between Europe and Asia, the Ural mountains. All
have regarded Russia as the core of this civilization, using a variety of definitions.
Using the term "Christian Orthodox civilization" implies that it also includes Greece,
a nation with a classical past that is one of the cornerstones of both European and
American civilization. No doubt religion plays a vital role in civilizations, but there
are many other aspects to take into account. Economic production, for example, is the
basis for the expansion of a civilization, as are such aspects as group security, power
relationships of a personal nature, material wealth, and psychological certainty.
In the Balkans, Bulgaria, a country formerly closely allied to Russia and with a
majority composed of Orthodox Christians, is now a member of the European Union
Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 2011
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(EU), which should be regarded as part of European civilization. When it came to
joining EU, Bulgaria was not a "torn country" in the terminology of Huntington. A
majority of the Bulgarian people sought to join the union.
The term "Russian civilization" would mean that the East Slavic civilization east of
Europe would be a culture that also includes Ukrainian and Belorussian cultures.
Especially in the case of Ukraine, there is the question as to what the "real core" is.
One could well argue that Ukraine provided the origin of the civilization in question
via the princely state of Kievan Rus. Kiev was a great center when Moscow was
hardly a village.
The State of Kiev, although the leading Eastern Slavic state and the largest state in the
area, never managed to control neighboring states. It remained an important influence
until the Tartar invasion of 1240. Rule by a series of princes of Kiev was interrupted
for more than a century, but this original nucleus did not go away completely. There
was always a chance that headed by a prominent prince who could add his land to
Kiev, the city might once more be a symbol of unity among all the Eastern Slavs.
After the disintegration of the Kievan state, two new centers of the Eastern Slavs
emerged, Novgorod and Suzdal.
The use of the term "Eurasian civilization" as a name for the civilization to the east of
European civilization would be similar to using the designation "Russian
civilization." It is only Russia among the Eastern Slavic states that could be said to be
related to such empires and cultures as the Huns, the Khaganate of the ancient Turkic
tribes, the Mongol Empire, and the Khazar Khaganate of Asia. Therefore "Eurasian
civilization" would exclude Ukraine and Belarus.
The final term, East Slavic civilization, in my view, would be the most appropriate
for the three cultures of Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia. The question today is,
however, do the three want to remain part of this civilization? Presently, Belarus is
firmly allied to a Russia that rejects the West. The present Russian leaders are
nationalists or even Eurasianists, turning to Asia and the east.
The case of Ukraine is somewhat different. After the Orange revolution in 2005, the
country has increasingly been turning west seeking EU and NATO membership. The
trend to the West was slowed after the election of President Viktor Yanukovych. The
demography of Ukraine with its large Russian minority on the border of Russia is
complicated.
Western Ukraine has a heritage as part of the Hapsburg Empire (Galicia), while parts
of that area were also in Russian hands. When the Poles revolted against Russian rule,
they sought support in Ukraine. The young Taras Shevchenko, who would later
become Ukraine's national poet, had contacts with some of the Polish leaders. The
revolt of the Poles in 1831 resulted, however, in the crushing of Ukrainian
nationalism. Russification was intensified in Russian Ukraine, but only resulted in
further rise of national consciousness.
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol64/iss64/7
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So far, the demands of the Ukrainian leaders were only modest: cultural freedom, and
autonomy in a Slavic federation. The "Brotherhood" was founded in Kiev in 1846.
The name indicated some sort of Slavic solidarity, but the group was also dedicated to
national freedom for Ukrainians. The society was closed down in 1847 by the Russian
authorities. Shevchenko, who had played a leading role in the "Brotherhood," was
exiled to Siberia.
Later, Austrian Galicia became somewhat of a center for a national movement of both
Ukrainians and Poles as the empire allowed a development of autonomy. When the
Polish state was restored after World War I, parts of Galicia were included in the
republic, resulting in a large Ukrainian minority in Poland. Ukrainian nationalists
fought continuously against the Polish authorities during the interwar period.
When Soviet troops retook Ukraine during the Second World War, Ukrainian
nationalists who had fought against Nazi occupation now turned their weapons on the
returning Soviet regime. Resistance against Soviet occupation continued in Ukraine
until around 1950, a struggle unsupported by the western allies.
It is therefore only natural that there is strong support for a turn to the West in the
parts of Ukraine closest to the borderlands of European civilization. Much of the old
animosity between Ukrainians and Poles has been forgotten. An important reason for
this is that Poland strongly supported the Orange revolution in Ukraine.
Of the 46 million inhabitants of Ukraine, 77% are Ukrainians and 17% Russians (the
remaining 6% are of various other nationalities). A great majority of Ukrainians thus
advocate a turn to the West in some form. As always when Russians are involved,
there is a risk of Moscow counteraction should Ukraine join the EU and particularly
in the event of NATO membership.
A "westernization" of Ukraine could be possible even after 2010. Ukraine as an EU
member country would, of course, retain its cultural and religious Slavic roots, just as
the East Central European Slavs with similar roots have done. Ukraine would also be
welcomed by Western Europeans. The problem is the Russian reaction and the
influence of Moscow in Germany and some other EU states dependant on Russian
gas.
This paper has mainly dealt with relations between European civilization and East
Slavic civilization. It does not mean that the link to American civilization is weak.
With the exception of the Yalta betrayal of Poland, Polish-American relations have
been good and are good today. From the colonial era, for instance, there was the
participation of a few Polish leaders in the American War of Independence. More
important was the mass emigration of Ukrainians and Poles to America in the 19^
century.
The Wilsonian era was a great breakthrough, mainly for the Poles as they were given
an opportunity once more to create an independent state. During the final decade of
the Cold War, Polish resistance to Communism found strong support in America and
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there was also American backing for the Orange revolution in Ukraine.
The whole question of the relationship between the two Western civilizations and
East Slavic civilization will most likely to be of increasing importance in the coming
decades.
America has left Europe behind, but is not seeking to dominate European civilization.
The future of the East Slavic civilization is not in Eurasia, as claimed by the
Eurasianists of Russia. It is in closer relations with the West of the American and
European civilizations. Bulgaria is already an example of the move towards the West
by an Orthodox Christian nation. Another example is Ukraine, which has opened to
the West, although its final course is uncertain.
Civilizational borders are historically vague and vary over time. They can even
overlap. Russia and Belarus have everything to gain by cooperating with the West in
the fields of economy and technology. Such links would not endanger the East Slavic
cultural heritage, but would be a strategic guarantee for the survival of its Christian
heritage and for a modernization that is necessary during the 21 s t century.
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Endnotes
'Halecki was a Polish historian who served as an expert at the Paris Peace Conference (1918 - 1919).
From 1919 he was a professor at the University of Warsaw. Emigrating to the United States he was
appointed professor at Fordham University (1944 - 1961) and also Columbia University.
2

Danilevsky, a Russian philosopher and historian, was a leading personality in the pan-Slavic
movement of the nineteenth century. He was the first to describe history as a number of different
civilizations. He studied at the University of St Petersburg when he became politically involved. As a
result he was arrested and deported to Siberia. Returning to Russia he was involved in organizing
marine expeditions.
It was his work Russia and Europe (1869) that made him famous. He believed every civilization was
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influenced by its language and culture. These could not be passed to other civilizations. Danilevsky
had some influence on Spengler and Toynbee.
Kjellen, a Swedish professor, geographer and geopolitician, created the term geopolitics (geopolitik in
Swedish). He based his system on the organic view of the state influenced by the German geographer
Friedrich Ratzel. Kjellen's main work was The State as a Form of Life (Staten som lifsform, 1916).
His international state system was presented in The Great Powers (Stormakterna, 1905, many later
editions).
4

Spengler, a German philosopher and historian, published The Decline of the West (1918-1922). He
believed that every civilization (which he termed culture) had a distinct organic form that grows,
matures, and decays. Civilizations are in his view independent from external influences.
Toynbee, a British historian, published the multivolume work A Study of History (1934 - 1961; 12
volumes). He compared over twenty civilizations and found cyclical patterns of growth, maturity, and
decay in all of them. They thrived best in response to challenges.
6

Koneczny was a Polish philosopher and historian. He is known as one of the founders of the
comparative study of civilizations. A professor at the Jagiellonian University in Krakow he later
moved to the University of Vilnius but in 1929 returned to Krakow.
7

Trubetskoi, N.S., (1925) 1993, "O Turanskom elemente v russki kulture". In Rossia mezhdu
i Asiei.

Europoi

g

Huntington was an American political scientist and civilizationist. He began teaching at Harvard
University in 1950. After teaching at some other universities he returned to Harvard and remained
there until his death. His book The Clash of Civilizations (1996) made him famous.
9

Trubetskoi was a Russian linguist, ethnologist, and student of culture. He was also one of the founders
of Eurasianism.
At first Trubetskoi studied old languages and the comparative method. He also continued his studies of
non-Indo-European languages and folklore (especially Finno-Ugric and Caucasian).
In 1913 Trubetskoi graduated with a work on the expression of the future in Indo-European languages
and continued his studies. The 1917 Bolshevik Revolution found him in the Caucasus, and he never
saw Moscow again. He migrated south with the White Army and eventually came to Constantinople.
There he received an offer from the University of Sofia and spent two years as an assistant professor in
Bulgaria. In Sofia in 1920, Trubetskoi published his book Rossiia i chelovechestvo (Russia and
Mankind), which inaugurated Eurasianism.
His next book was titled (in translation) The Legacy of Genghis Khan: A Perspective on Russian
History Not from the West but from the East (1925). Trubetskoi's attack on European ethnocentricity
found many supporters and many opponents among his contemporaries.
He later moved to the University of Vienna to become a professor of Slavic languages. He was the
founder of a branch of linguistics known as phonology. His main ally in that endeavor was Roman
Jakobson, another Russian exile from Moscow, who lived in Czechoslovakia.
In 1938 German troops occupied Austria and Trubetskoi was questioned by the Gestapo and his papers
were impounded. He died in June the same year.
'"Karsavin, a Russian philosopher, created an original religious philosophical system, personalism.
Born in St. Petersburg he graduated from the university there in 1906 and from 1915 he was professor.
After the Russian revolution Karsavin was arrested but released and exiled in 1922. Spending time
both in Berlin and Paris he later became professor at the University of Kaunas (Lithuania). After the
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Second World War he remained in Soviet Lithuania and was arrested in 1949 and sentenced to ten
years imprisonment. He died in a camp hospital.
' 'Savitsky was a Russian geographer.
12

Vernadsky was a Russian-American historian and an author of numerous books of Russian history.
He studied at the University of Moscow but had to leave in 1905 for two years in Germany. He
graduated in 1910 in Moscow but later moved to St Petersburg.
A non-communist he lectured during the years of the Russian Civil War (1917-1920) for a year in
Perm, then in Kiev and ultimately followed the White Army to Simferopol (Crimea), where he taught
at the local university for two years. Moving to Athens later that year after the defeat of the Whites he
came to settle in Prague, teaching there from 1921 to 1925 at the Russian School of Law. With
Trubetskoi and Petr Savitsky he formulated Eurasianist theories.
Vernadsky was offered a position at Yale University in the United States in 1927 and served as a
professor of Russian history at that university until his retirement in 1956.
13

Jakobson was born in Russia and studied in Moscow. In 1920 he moved to Prague and continued his
linguistic studies. During the 1920s he joined the Eurasianist movement.
He escaped from Prague at the beginning of the Second World War via Berlin to Denmark, then
Norway and to Sweden. Later during the war he managed to cross the Atlantic and settled in the
United States lecturing from 1949 at Harvard until his retirement.
14

Suvchinsky, a Ukrainian philosopher and writer on music, was a leading member of the Eurasianist
movement. Emigrating from Russia in 1922 he lived in Berlin and Sofia (Bulgaria). Finally he settled
in Paris, where he lived for the rest of his life.
l?
Gumilev was during the Soviet era expelled from the University of Leningrad and spent most of his
youth in the Gulag (1938 - 1956).

After Stalin had died he was employed at the Hermitage Museum and participated in several
expeditions to the Volga Delta and North Caucasus. From the 1960s he lectured at the University of
Leningrad and presented a doctoral thesis on ancient Turkish peoples. Employed later at the
Geography Institute he defended a new doctoral thesis this time in geography. Most of his later
monographs were banned from publication and his ideas were rejected in the Soviet Union.
' 6 For more on Eurasianism see the vast literature on the subject in Russian Eurasianism: An Ideology
of Empire by Marlene Laruelle (2008). The author shows how in recent years Russian politicians
including Prime Minister Vladimir Putin have begun to support a geopolitical strategy that puts Russia
in the center. The book by Laruelle examines the political and growing intellectual impact of
Eurasianism, a movement that promotes the ideology of Russian-Asian greatness. This greatness can
only, according to Eurasianists, be expressed in an empire. The author is currently a research fellow at
the Central Asia and Caucasus Institute of the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies
at the Johns Hopkins University.
On Eurasianism see also Mark Bassin's paper "Eurasianism and Geopolitics in Post-Soviet Russia",
Conference Proceedings "Russia and Europe" in Oslo, Norway (1996).
A notable development during the beginning of the twenty-first century is an interest in Iran and
Turkey in Russian thinking in the field. See "Russian Eurasianism: Model for Iran and Turkey?" by
Professor B. Ersanli et al. in Turkish Review of Eurasian Studies, 2004, No. 4.
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